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Abstract 
Purpose: This paper aims to elucidate al-Ghazali and Maimonides ontological arguments in proving God’s existence by 
analysing their theological writings. In the golden age of Islamic civilization, fellow Jewish and Christian were seen to be 
engaged in theological discourse with Muslim scholars. In adjacent, al-Ghazali and Maimonides were seen playing vital 
roles in affirming the existence of God in their respective religions. 
Methodology: This paper is qualitative in nature and employs content analysis. Both al-Ghazali and Maimonides’ 
arguments are then analysed comparatively. Comparative theology is done to examine theological discourse as part of 
inter-religious dialogue.  
Main Findings: This study finds that their arguments differ in interpreting the necessary existent which Maimonides’ dual 
categorization of necessary existence distinguishes their arguments from there onwards. This entails the dual argument by 
which Maimonides affirmed God is the agent and cause of every occurrence. Meanwhile, al-Ghazālī only affirmed God is 
the agent through His will and concept of particularization. 
Applications: This paper is vital in discussing the concept of God through inter-theological dialogue.  
Novelty/Originality: Notwithstanding the significant number of texts on divine existence, the researcher found no study 
that specifically deals with al-Ghazālī and Maimonides’ discourses on the existence of God. Needless to say, comparisons 
of the concept of God in Islam and Judaism are very limited in contrast to Islam and Christianity. 
Keywords: Ontological discourse, al-Ghazali, Maimonides, Islamic civilization. 
INTRODUCTION 
Claims of being theistic religions are central to the Abrahamic faiths especially in Islam and Judaism who both shared a 
strict monotheistic belief (Wyschogrod. 1982). The argument of God’s existence is considered as one of the major 
philosophical discourse. Emerging from Aristotle’s argument, different forms of arguments arise in the Islamic world and 
its counterparts (Watt. 1963). The studies of metaphysics and cosmology have emerged within the context of Greek 
philosophy. Various interpretations of God have been presented: Plato’s idea of Good, Aristotle’s prime mover, Plotinus’s 
trinity and Epicurus’s blessed and immortal God (Kenny. 2010). Further developments were made in medieval times by 
Muslim philosophers such as al-Kindī (801-873 AD), al-Fārābī (872-950 AD) and Ibn Sīnā (980-1037 AD) after vigorous 
movements of translating Greek philosophy into Arabic (Campanini. 2008 & Leaman. 1985). The influence of Greek 
philosophy on early Muslim philosophy was inevitable as Neo-Platonism and Neo Aristotelianism began in the realm of 
Islamic intellectuals (Ramadan. 2004). Consequently, the influence immersed into Islamic and Jewish traditions, which led 
to the excessive rationalization of religious doctrines and the neglect of the revelations. Discourses on God’s existence has 
been vastly deliberated (Davidson. 1987, Wolfson. 1979, Richardson. 2013, Rudolph & Seidel. 2019 & Burns. 2019). The 
argument on God’s existence has been a debatable subject throughout the history of religion due to his invisibility. 
Ontological arguments attempt to discuss God’s existence by various means of consideration on the ideas of God. This 
occurs to correspond the ideas of God with the definitions in confirming His existence (Joseph & Elijah. 2019). Anselm 
(1033-1109) was among the pioneer who initiated God as “being than which no greater can be conceived” (Grenz. 1994).  
The emerging trend during that time in inculcating rational interpretations within religious discourse has triggered scholars 
to be engaged in the inter-theological dialogue. Thus this study adopts comparative theology in examining al-Ghazali and 
Maimonides’ arguments on God’s existence. The method of comparative theology analysis is increasingly being used by 
religious scholars to bridge religions. Scholar such as Francis X Clooney (1993), who is regarded as a pioneer of this 
method, and more recently Maire Byrne, have done massive work based on this methodological framework. Nevertheless, 
their proposed methodology is meant to encourage comparative theologians to reduce one’s own tradition to simple 
information in order to not deprive the other traditions or impose one’s perspective of a tradition onto others. Indeed, this 
approach is definitely claimed to instill a naturalistic attitude. Kamaruzaman argued that the naturalistic approach neither 
forbids a believer to merely dispose of their own religion nor prohibits one from being objective and presenting justice to 
others (Kamaruzaman. 2010). A true loyal believer, however, must uphold their own religion amidst positioning it in 
comparison with others to eventually strengthen one’s belief (Sachau. 1964). Notwithstanding the significant number of 
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texts on divine existence, there is only a few writing that specifically deals with al-Ghazālī and Maimonides’ discourses on 
the existence of God. For instance, discussion on God generally can be found in Wolfson’s writing pertaining 
philosophical and theological arguments from Muslim and Jewish scholars (Wolfson. 1965).  Apart from that, there are 
also writings that demonstrate similarities of structure in their writings (Stroumsa. 2009. Gil’adi. 1979 & Harvey. 2005). 
This proves the relevance to examine their discourses comparatively. Needless to say, comparisons of the concept of God 
in Islam and Judaism are very limited in contrast to Islam and Christianity (Laksana. 2019), which have been studied 
extensively (Afaqi. 2011).
i
 As mentioned earlier, the exclusiveness of each religion is likely the cause of the small number 
of comparisons between Islam and Judaism.  
AL-GHAZALI’S ARGUMENT ON DIVINE EXISTENCE 
It is clear that al-Ghazālī affirmed God is the cause behind creating existence from non-existence. He first argued that all 
existence other than God involves bodies and accidents to originate. This is demonstrated through al-Ghazālī’s 
classification of existence into four different categories. Existence must be either extended (mutahayyiz) or non-extended 
(ghayr mutahayyiz). Extended existence can be divisible (mutahayyiz wa i’tilāf) or non-divisible (mutahayyiz wa ghayr 
i’tilāf). Non-extended existence can be with bodies (ghayr mutahayyiz bi al-jism) and without bodies (ghayr mutahayyiz 
bidūn al-jism) (al-Ghazali. 2008).  
The first two categories apply to extended (mutahayyiz) existence, which requires space. First, an existence that occupies 
space (mutahayyiz) and that can be divisible (i’tilāf) certainly constitutes a body and is known as a body (jism). Secondly, 
if there is no combination in it or in other terms, non-divisible (ghayr i’tilāf) is known as a single substance (jawhar fard) 
such as nafs and ‘aql. Both require space but are a single substance that does not constitute different parts. Unlike the first, 
a body constitutes different parts, such as our physical body consisting of multiple limbs (al-Ghazali. 2008).
ii
  
The last two categories refer to non-extended existence (ghayr mutahayyiz), which does not require space to exist. First, 
non-extended existence that requires bodies for it to exist is known as an accident.
iii
 On the other hand, the last category 
denotes non-extended existence that requires neither space nor body to exist and refers to God, Allah (al-Ghazali. 2008).
iv
  
From his categorization of existence, it is observed that al-Ghazālī clearly separated God’s existence from other existence, 
His existence is neither a substance nor a body and certainly not an accident. Body and substance according to al-Ghazālī 
can be perceived with the senses. This is not the case with God’s existence, as it can only be perceived by proof and not 
perception. God’s existence can only be known through the existence of the universe as a product of His power. This leads 
to al-Ghazālī’s fundamental premise that all existents other than God (bodies or accidents) are temporal, and every 
temporal being has a cause.  
In explicating the nature of God’s existence, al-Ghazālī highlighted God’s necessary existence, which is through His 
essence and not dependent on other existence. God is eternal, (qadīm) impossible to cease and also pre-eternal (azalī) (Al-
Zabidi. n.d).
v
 Al-Ghazālī underlined that other things besides God are considered possible existents. Only God is the sole, 
necessary existent. In his Ma’ārij al-Quds, al-Ghazālī explained eight important aspects of necessary existence: 1) it must 
not be associated with accidents, as it is related to bodily figures; 2) it must not possess a physical body, as it is related to 
numbers, matter (māddah) and forms; 3) it must not possess a form or shape, as both are related to materials; 4) God’s 
existence is His quiddity (māhiyyah); 5) God must not be related to others in His existence that entails a causal existence; 
6) God must not be related to others in a form of accommodation that leads to possible existence; 7) it is impossible to 
possess two necessary existences, likewise it is impossible for one body to possess two souls, and 8) every other object 
besides necessary existents must be dependent on this existence (Dunyā. n.d).vi  
Although he incorporated some points made by Ibn Sīnā, it can be observed that al-Ghazālī’s version of necessary 
existence differs from Ibn Sīnā’s in three aspects. Firstly, al-Ghazālī denied any necessary causal relation. Secondly, in al-
Ghazālī’s view, God’s attributes do not signify a multiplicity of the essence.vii Thirdly, they differ in terms of surah and 
hayula, whose positions Ibn Sīnā affirmed in every material body, whereas al-Ghazālī denied the notion of potential and 
actual in every form that realizes existence. This is because every existence requires an external force to realize it. It can be 
deduced that according to al-Ghazālī, God must not be associated with any directions, forms, places, movements or related 
accidents. It is impossible to relate God to any substance that consists of accidents, quantity, and quality or even 
inseparable bodies. 
It can be deduced that the existence of God was explicated by al-Ghazālī in two ways. One way is to ponder upon God’s 
creation, which can be perceived through senses or through the proofs stated in Qur’anic verses.viii The second way is 
through dialectical argumentations of the created universe, whereby his proposition consists of two muqaddimah and as a 
result, 1) the universe is contingent, and 2) every contingent has a cause (sabab). Therefore, the result is if the universe 
possesses a cause, it is Allah (al-Ghazāli. 2008). 
In sum, the existence of God must be emphasized as eternal existence with no beginning and no end. It is essential to 
differentiate between the created, and temporal and eternal. The proof presented by al-Ghazālī is that if God originated and 
is not eternal, He would require an originator Himself. Subsequently, His originator would need another originator and so 
on, to infinity. And that which goes on endlessly will never reach an eternal One who is the first cause. Therefore, the 
existence of a creator of the universe is absolutely necessary.  
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MAIMONIDES’ ARGUMENT ON DIVINE EXISTENCE 
In the discussion of God’s existence, Maimonides reiterated the Avicennian theory of essence and existence. He affirmed 
that in God’s case, essence and existence are identical, as His essence is His existence. God’s essence and existence should 
not be distinguished as He is the only necessary being and His Being cannot be associated with any accidents 
(Maimonides. 1963).
ix
 This is different from other creations or the sublunar entity. Existence is an accident attached to 
essence (Rudavsky. 2010).
x
 God, on the other hand, must not be ascribed accidents such as attributes. This must be totally 
rejected as being part of God’s essence, as it contains the notion of temporality, whereas God’s essence is one and 
unchanging. As Maimonides mentioned, “It is known that existence is an accident appertaining to all things and therefore 
an element superadded to their essence.”) (Maimonides. 1963). Therefore, Maimonides clearly affirmed God as an 
absolute existence and essence. As mentioned in The Guide, 
Accordingly, His existence is identical to His essence and His true reality, and His essence is His existence. Thus, His 
essence does not have an accident attached to it when it exists, in which case its existence would be a notion that is 
superadded to it… consequently, He exists, but not through an existence other than His essence. (Maimonides. 1963: 80) 
Maimonides proved the existence of God through another argument that begins with three possibilities regarding the nature 
of existence. First, all things are without beginning and end, which means all things are not subject to generation and 
corruption. Second, all things have a beginning and end, which indicates all things are subject to generation and corruption. 
Third, some are with beginning and end, and some are not subject to generation and corruption (Maimonides. 1963). All 
things must fall into one of these three categories. 
The first argument is certainly absurd since it is the most sensible to the human intellect that things exist and cease. The 
second argument is also inadmissible. If everything we perceive were only transient in nature, then all things would be 
destroyed and no beings would be able to produce anything (Wolfson. 1965).
xi
 Given that, we must admit our own 
existence, and subsequently the second argument cannot be accepted. Hence, it is impossible to say that all things either 
has a beginning and end or nothings have a beginning and end. Maimonides then argued that if we ourselves exist and 
things around us exist, there must be a being that is not subject to a beginning and end, or generation and destruction. This 
being is rather a necessary existent and eternal in nature. The necessary existent must be excluded from plurality, 
corporeality and reliance on any cause for its existence (Maimonides. 1963).
xii
  Maimonides then summed up the existence 
of God with the borrowed notion of ‘necessary existent’ from Ibn Sīnā. He also distinguished between contingent and 
necessary beings, which determine existence with a beginning and end and existence without either. 
According to Maimonides, God is not a substance whose existence is joined to an accident that may cause superadded 
elements to His Essence.
xiii
 It can be noted that Maimonides borrowed the concept of absolute existence from Avicenna, 
who advocated the concept of necessary and possible existence (Ramadan. 2004). According to Maimonides, there are two 
dimensions to the concept of necessary existence. First, necessary existence is on account of itself. Secondly, necessary 
existence is on account of external force.
xiv
 God exists necessarily on His own account. His demonstration of independent 
existence consequently cannot be attributed to any external cause. It is the effect of the eternal cause and must, therefore, 
itself be eternal. Whereas, necessary existence on account of external forces refers to the existence of the universe and 
natural order. In the latter case, existence on its own makes it possible to exist or not to exist. However, its existence is 
necessary due to the necessary being as the independent existent (Maimonides. 1963).
xv
 
This argument was clearly reiterated by Maimonides from Aristotle’s philosophy. The theory of existence is due to the 
inability to explain the origin of material beings from an immaterial being (God). Therefore, according to the philosophers, 
this eternal being co-exists with God but nevertheless shares a different eternal entity.
xvi
 
The existence of God is also proven through the theory of potential and actual. All perceived things undergo two states 
before existing in reality. A thing must first be in a state of potential before it is actualized as real essence. No matter in this 
universe is devoid from this transition. Everything needs an agent to initiate existence. God becomes the mover, as 
suggested by Aristotle.  He moves each matter from its potential state to an actual state. It is in the potential state due to 
some obstacles within itself that hinder it from being actualized. Hence, God’s existence is indeed necessary (Maimonides. 
1963). 
The agent is essential in removing the obstacles and also has a role in creating the relationship between the universe and 
other substances within their transition to actual state. However, the agent will cause potential to the being of actuals and 
other actuals caused by other agents due to this relation, which will lead to infinite causality (Storumsa. 2009). Thus, the 
real agent must be excluded from this chain of causality, as the real agent cannot be associated with these possibilities or 
else it would not exist. Another argument advocates that these possibilities only occur to material substance as they are 
connected to matter (Maimonides. 1963).  
Maimonides expounded 25 propositions
xvii
 of the philosophers that founded the reasoning behind God’s existence and 
unity (Maimonides. 1963). Nevertheless, it is noted that Maimonides, who was heavily influenced by Aristotle’s logic, 
could no longer ignore his reasoning of cosmological matter. He claimed that the ultimate cause of all genesis and 
destruction from the motion of the spheres requires an agent to cause the motion. Thus, the mover could neither be 
corporeally separated from the spheres nor be a force indivisible from the spheres (Maimonides. 1963).  
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The above argument was construed based on Aristotle’s physics theory of motion. Although Aristotle did not contest this 
argument to prove God’s existence, it was applied by medieval philosophers and reiterated by Maimonides. God has 
existed eternally in an actual state and became the eternal cause of motion, known as the First Mover (Rudavsky. 2010).  
In addition, God’s existence can also be proven through parables that Maimonides apparently borrowed from Jewish 
scholar Judah Halevi, whose book is known as Kuzari (Halevi. 1998). This book is presented in the form of conversations 
between a rabbi and a pagan. He exemplified that the justice practiced in India does not necessarily indicate a just king. 
Maimonides might have borrowed his arguments on the existence of God, except that Halevi endeavored proofs of divine 
intervention in the history of the Israelites through the prophets compared to the syllogistic cosmic proofs presented by 
Maimonides in demonstrating God’s existence. 
Maimonides connoted that the existence of a king can be demonstrated through his accidents, actions or even most remote 
relations to other objects. Correspondingly, God’s existence can be demonstrated through His creation of the universe. 
However, His existence must be discerned from other existences, as others can be perceived through accidents.  
Here, it can be deduced that in providing proof of God’s existence, Maimonides mainly collated Aristotle and Avicenna’s 
views. Maimonides’ proofs consist of God being the first cause of motion, He does not move nor is subject to a beginning 
and end, and is one and incorporeal. His essence is an absolute essence devoid of any accidents. The first cause also exists 
necessarily and does not require any other cause for the deity to exist.  
COMPARATIVE DISCOURSE 
Prior to discussing God’s existence, both al-Ghazālī and Maimonides categorized existence into two parts, which connote 
God’s existence and other existences. Al-Ghazālī categorized existence into two: necessary existence and possible 
existence. Maimonides, on the other hand, categorized necessary existence into necessary existence on its own account and 
necessary existence due to some external force. In the categorization of possible existence, Maimonides did not directly 
discuss necessary existence. However, he admitted that all contingencies are considered possible existence. This was 
proposed by Aristotle, which Maimonides reiterated approvingly.  
It is seemingly obvious there is a divergence between al-Ghazālī and Maimonides’ categorizations of necessary existence. 
Al-Ghazālī coined necessary existence as referring to God per se while Maimonides understood necessary existence in a 
dual manner: one, referring to God and the other referring to the universe as iterated by Aristotle, or eternal matter as 
applied by Plato. 
Al-Ghazālī conversely argued in his Iqtişād that if the universe is eternal as claimed by the philosophers, and whose 
existence is attributed to its categorization as necessary existence on account of others, there would be two eternal and that 
is impossible. This would simultaneously lead to negating God’s oneness and eternal existence. Nevertheless, Maimonides 
had claimed earlier that the classification into two forms would not cause two necessary existences since the absolute 
independent existence would only be that of God. God exists on account of His essence, whereas other necessary existence 
occurs due to an external factor, God.  
 According to Maimonides, the necessary existence of its own account is the force that would then be the ‘being’ that 
possesses absolute existence. It, therefore, becomes certain there must be a being that has absolutely independent existence 
and is the source of the existence of all transient things. Thus, according to Aristotle, with whom Maimonides agreed, there 
must be in existence such a being that is the effect of an eternal cause and must, therefore, itself be eternal.  
Thus, it can be observed that God’s necessary existence was generally agreed upon by both scholars. The main discrepancy 
is in their argument on necessary existence due to external factors, which is closely related to the cosmological discourse. 
In establishing the concept of necessary existence, however, it is apparent that both al-Ghazālī and Maimonides read Ibn 
Sīnā who coined the categorization of necessary and possible existences. The concept of necessary existence is 
nevertheless in line with the peripatetic philosophers’ route of argument. It can be seen that in reiterating this concept al-
Ghazālī was mindful and objectively criticized the shortcomings of the proposition. 
One of the propositions from which al-Ghazālī withdrew the list of propositions with regards to necessary existence was 
the concept of potential and actual. Ibn Sīnā incorporated this concept to explain necessary causation, which he accepted as 
part of the debate that is also seen in Maimonides’ discourse and other peripatetic philosophers who accepted the 
suggestion of an eternal universe. Al-Ghazālī, however, strongly refuted the eternity of the universe and thus refuted the 
concept of potential and actual in God’s necessary existence.  
Al-Ghazālī refuted the theory of actual and potential by rebutting necessary causation. When one thing is in a state of 
potential, it indicates that it already has the form of actual imbued within its essence. The actual must then realize the form 
of potential, which is readily inherent within the form. Al-Ghazālī, on the other hand, argued that it is possible for God’s 
power to create something that is not necessarily to be realized from its form. Furthermore, it is impossible for two 
accidents to inhere a form, as advocated in the theory of potentialities. The theory of potential and actual subsequently 
implies a deficiency of God’s power, with which al-Ghazālī completely disagreed as it would also eventually entail 
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understanding necessary causation. Thus, al-Ghazālī absolutely repudiated this theory from being part of the proposition on 
God’s necessary existence.  
Al-Ghazālī’s explanation of the term ‘necessary being’ was not present in either his Iḥyā’ or Iqtiṣād as in most other 
discussions on God. However, he elaborated this in his Maqāṣid by reiterating Ibn Sīnā’s logic with some modification. 
Meanwhile, in his Iḥyā’ and Iqtiṣād al-Ghazālī only mentioned God’s necessary existence according to the Scriptures as 
well as logical and sensory proofs. This is perhaps due to the highly philosophical form of discussion that took place on the 
necessary existence of God that may not be as essential to the layman.   
On the other hand, Maimonides emphasized God’s necessary existence in The Guide quite extensively by reiterating 
Aristotle’s demonstration of the threefold proof of God’s existence, unity, and incorporeality. The theory of necessary 
existence does not only define God’s existence according to Maimonides, but the argument is certainly closely intertwined 
with the notion of the existence of the universe held by the philosophers in proving the teleological design of God and the 
universe.   
 In sum, both appear to defend the same argument that God is a necessary existent in demonstrating His existence. While 
al-Ghazālī refuted some of the requirements, Maimonides did not find any deficiencies with Ibn Sīnā’s proposition of 
necessary existence. This is because he accepted Ibn Sīnā’s theory of potential and actual, which entails an emanative 
perception of God and necessary causation as discussed further subsequently. 
CONCLUSION 
With respect to God’s existence, both scholars agreed with Ibn Sīnā’s notion of God’s necessary existence. They differed 
in terms of conceptualizing necessary existence. Al-Ghazālī nullified the concept of potential and actual with the 
proposition of necessary existence since he strongly refuted peripatetic philosophy. Maimonides, on the other hand, fully 
adopted Ibn Sīnā’s proposition on the potentiality of forms. Maimonides further categorized necessary existence in two: 
necessary on its own account and necessary due to external factors. Al-Ghazālī entirely refuted the twofold concept of 
necessary existence, as it causes the annulation of God’s omnipotence in His relation with creations and it entails dualism 
in understanding the eternal.    
Similarities between al-Ghazālī and Maimonides in the discussion above are only evident in their affirmation of God’s 
necessary existence. However, their underlying arguments on necessary existence differed. Maimonides’ dual 
categorization of necessary existence definitely distinguishes their arguments from there onwards. This entails the dual 
argument by which Maimonides affirmed God is the agent and cause of every occurrence. Meanwhile, al-Ghazālī only 
affirmed God is the agent through His will and concept of particularization. 
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Notes: 
                                                          
i
 One of the studies was done by Muhammad Iqbal Afaqi as a comparative study on the concept of God in Islamic and 
Christian epistemology. See Muhammad Iqbal Afaqi. Knowledge Of God: A Comparative Study of Christian and Islamic 
Epistemology. (Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 2011). The author concludes with a pluralistic understanding of 
salvation, which agrees on multiple paths to the same goal. It certainly confides with the soteriological pluralism of Hick 
and is therefore not acceptable to the Quranic concept of plurality. Thus, this thesis will analyze both al-Ghazālī and 
Maimonides’ views on the Divinity and conclude based on the comparative method from the Islamic perspective. 
ii
 According to Jurjani in his Ta’rifat, substance (jawhar) is of five different types, whether abstract or non-abstract. 
Abstract substance is such as the mind and soul, whereas non-abstract substance is such as body, form and matter.  
iii
 Al-Ghazālī shunned sophists who disagreed with the theory of accidents, as they claimed that knowledge may or may not 
exist. Accidents are mere possibilities that may or may not exist. 
iv
 Al-Ghazālī, Al-Iqtisad fi al-‘Itiqad, 91 
v
 There is a slight difference between eternal and pre-eternal. Eternal is more specific than sempiternal, as eternity refers to 
existence that has no beginning while sempiternity infers existence that has no beginning of non-existence. Eternity is 
employed more specifically for God and His attributes. On the other hand, sempiternal also refers to no beginning of 
something that does not exist. It is impossible to refer to the non-existence of God. Thus, Azali further affirmed there is no 
beginning for non-existence, such as humans. Initially, man did not exist and the non-existence ended upon man’s creation. 
Hence, the beginning for non-existence is not even categorized under azalī, let alone qidam. See Al-Zabidi. Ithaf al-Sadah 
al-Muttaqin bi Syarh Iḥyā’ ‘Ulūm al-Dīn. 157. See also Al-Bājūrī, Ibrahim al- Bājūrī bin Muhammad al-Jizawi bin 
Ahmad. Tuḥfah al-Murid ‘ala Jawharah al-Tauhid. 108 
vi
 Al-Ghazālī, Ma’arij al-Quds fi Madarij Ma’rifah al-Nafs, (Cairo: Matba’ah al-Istiqamah), 141-142. See also Sulaiman 
Dunya. Al-Haqiqah fi Nazr al-Ghazālī. (Cairo: Dar al-Ma’arif), 177-178. Al-Ghazālī’s argument on necessary existence 
somehow resembles Ibn Sīnā’s theory of necessary existence as reiterated in his Maqāsidal-Falāsifah. Al-Ghazālī, 
Maqāsid al-Falāsifah. (Lebanon: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 2008), 107-110.   
vii
 In Ibn Sīnā’s requirements of Wajib al-Wujud, he denied the existence of attributes. In relation to that, he also delineated 
quiddity from God’s essence, as associating God with quiddity would eventually lead one to subsisting accidents to Him. 
Therefore, God must be conceived as a simple being who is free from any accidents such as attributes and quiddity. Al-
Ghazālī, Ma ‘arij al-Quds fī Madarij Ma’rifah al-Nafs. See also Sulaiman Dunya. Al-Haqiqah fi Nazr al-Ghazāli. 
viii
 Among the Qur’anic verses that prove God’s creation of the universe are:  Ibrāhīm 14: 32, al-Nahl 16: 14, al-Hajj 22: 
65, Luqmān 31: 29, al-Jāthiyah 45: 13, al-Baqarah 2: 164, al-Rūm 30: 22-23, al-Ghāshiyah 88: 17-26 
ix
 Maimonides. The Guide of the Perplexed, 59 
x
The issue of the relation between essence and existence has spurred a huge discussion among Muslim philosophers. This 
can be seen in Avicenna and Averroes’ debates on whether God’s existence and essence are identical or the other way 
around, as claimed by Averroes. See Rudavsky. Maimonides. 44 
xi
 Here, the existence and destruction of all things will happen at the same time if this implies Aristotle’s theory of infinite 
time. Eternal time and motion permit the generation of the universe and others. If time is finite, it would be impossible for 
the universe to exist, as nothing would precede its existence due to the inexistence of time. Hence, it is impossible to say 
all things have a beginning and ending. 
xii
 Maimonides. The Guide of the Perplexed, 152 
xiii
 Maimonides’ strong emphasis on God’s incorporeality leads to negating accidents from being associated to God, which 
eventually entails negating attributes from God.   
xiv
 This argument is mentioned in Maimonides’ proposition in demonstrating the existence of God, His unity and 
incorporeality intertwiningly. There are generally four philosophical arguments employed by Maimonides. i) God is 
incorporeal through demonstrating the impossibility of God being a distributed or indivisible force and also corporeal. ii) 
God’s unity can be demonstrated only through cause and effect because incorporeal beings cannot be counted, as the 
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relation of time is not applicable to God. iii) God is without beginning and end. Thus, He exists necessarily on account of 
Himself. iv) All substance moves from potential to actual. Hence, substance requires a mover to move it from one state to 
another. Maimonides. The Guide of the Perplexed. 150-153 
xv
 From the premise of necessary existence on account of the other stems the theory of necessary causation, which leads to 
the emanative theory and consequently, accepting the theory of an eternal universe. These theories are mostly dominated 
by Aristotle. Maimonides, who strongly upheld Aristotle’s demonstrations, affirmed Avicenna’s ideas in support of 
Aristotle’s notion.  
xvi
 In the discourse on eternal being, there are mainly two differing notions: one, the eternal existent is the universe itself, as 
claimed by Aristotle, and two, the eternal existent refers to the eternal matter from which God created the universe and 
others, as proposed by Plato. This will be discussed later in the cosmological argument. Nevertheless, this theory is 
essential and is where Maimonides later departed from Aristotle’s teaching. 
xvii
 There are seven important propositions held by Aristotle: 
(P.3) Denial of the infinite regress: “the existence of causes and effects, of which the number is infinite, is impossible”  
(P.5) Definition of change as motion: “every motion is a change and transition from potentiality to actuality”  
(P.17) The existence of movers: “everything that is in motion requires a mover by necessity;” this mover can be outside the 
moved object, or in the body in motion  
(P.19) Definition of possible existence: “everything that has a cause for its existence is only possible with regard to 
existence with respect to its own essence”  
(P.20) Definition of necessary existence: “everything that is necessarily existent with respect to its own essence has no 
cause for its existence in any way”  
(P.25) Definition of a proximate mover: everything is comprised of matter and form. But inasmuch as matter does not 
move itself, there must be an agent, “a mover that moves the substratum so as to predispose it to receive the form.” This 
mover is the proximate mover, which “predisposes the matter of a certain individual” (GP 2.Intro:239). 
(P.26) Eternity of the universe: “I shall add to the premises mentioned before one further premise that affirms as necessary 
the eternity of the world. This premise . . . [consists of Aristotle’s statement] that time and movement are eternal, perpetual, 
existing in actu.” Maimonides noted in his explication of this premise that Aristotle’s arguments in favor of this statement 
do not constitute a demonstration. 
